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The changing wage and employment structure in some OECD countries has been
attributed to increased levels of education and technical change in favour of skilled
workers. However, in the Netherlands and some other OECD countries the wages of
skilled workers did not rise, whereas investment in skills rose dramatically. This paper
offers a theory which is able to explain the dramatic increase in the level of education and
skills without rising wages since the early 1980s. In this respect, we integrate the supply
side framework (human capital investments) and the demand side (containing
endogenous skill upgrading as a result of job competition and screening) in a general
equilibrium model. In this way we provide a theory for the empirical observation of
rising unemployment levels among unskilled workers and rising employment levels of
skilled workers with relatively stable wages.
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1.  Introduction
The structure of wages and employment has shifted in favour of skilled workers in many
OECD countries over the past decades.
1 Many studies have observed polarisation of the
wage structure in the United States and the United Kingdom, while in many European
countries the adjustment process went mainly through rises in unemployment among
unskilled workers (e.g. Card, Kramarz and Lemieux, 1996, Berman, Bound and Machin,
1998 and Machin and Van Reenen, 1998).
Various reasons have been brought forward in the literature for rising European
unemployment levels and a relatively stable wage.
 2 It is often attributed to the generosity
of the welfare state, which leads to a high degree of upward wage pressure for unskilled
labour, resulting in too high real wages for the relatively unskilled. Downward labour
market rigidities as opposed to highly flexible financial markets also lead to out of
equilibrium situations, resulting in unemployment levels higher than the natural rate
levels. In addition, it is argued that the productivity slowdown since the first oil crisis and
the resulting (skill-biased) technical change have raised the natural rate of
unemployment. Finally, European systems of wage bargaining result into too high wages,
which in turn induce a too high level of unemployment. Wasmer (1999) argues in this
respect that the increase in the share of temporary work in total employment has
negatively affected the bargaining position of workers with short-term contracts. He finds
evidence that this evolution has also substantially affected unemployment.
Another interesting factor influencing the European unemployment problem, which is not
touched upon yet, is the observation of dramatic increases of levels of education during
the last decade, which did not go along with rising wage levels or wage premiums on
                                                          
1 See Chennells and Van Reenen (1999) and Sanders and Ter Weel (1999) for recent overviews.
2 See e.g. Layard and Nickell (1986), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Sarantis (1993), Phelps (1994),
Madsen (1998) and Nickell (1998). A particular interesting reference is Phelps and Zoega (1998) who
argue that the increase in the unemployment rate in the 1970s and 1980s is caused by both increasing real
interest rates, which have driven up mark-ups, and increasing taxes, unemployment benefits, and social
expenditures, which made it profitable to quit and change jobs thereby pushing up (real) wages above their
equilibrium levels.2
skilled labour. For example, in the Netherlands and Sweden the supply of skilled labour
has increased since the 1970s, but the returns to education and investment in skills have
declined strongly and are only recovering gradually, whereas attainment levels – if these
levels declined at all – have recovered strongly. Gottschalk (1997) observes that “the
relatively small increase in inequality in the Netherlands reflects a decline in the college
premium, which largely offsets the substantial increase between experience groups and
the increase in inequality within groups.” This decline is according to Gottschalk due to
the large increase in the supply of college graduates. Topel (1997) observes the same
phenomenon for Sweden.
3 An OECD (1996) study adds to this that during the 1980s
dispersion of earnings increased strongly only in the United Kingdom; Austria, Belgium,
Portugal and Spain faced only a slight increase. Wage dispersion decreased in Germany
and France and there was no clear change in Italy.
4
These observations of increased education without further wage dispersion can be
explained in different ways. First, these observations indicate to a certain extent
overinvestment in education and skills. Freeman (1976) and Rumberger (1981) examined
this issue thoroughly when in the 1960s the United States faced this problem. They
described the falling (net) returns to investment in human capital and concluded that
overeducation led to crowding out of skills. However, the reason why workers overinvest
in education is not so obvious from these studies.
Second, as Acemoglu (1998) points out, new technologies may not be complementary to
skills by nature, but by design. He shows that the direction of technical change can
                                                          
3 Topel (1997) presents the Swedish situation and shows a sharp decrease in the college premium from the
late sixties onwards, and again a small increase after the mid-eighties. Male school enrolment also falls
sharply in the early seventies “which shows that college enrolments do respond to declining returns to
schooling” (p. 69). However, Topel does not comment on the much stronger increase in school enrolment
in the late eighties and early nineties, when compared to the very modest increase in the college premium.
With respect to the latter he comments that “... the returns to education in Sweden remain extraordinary
low” (p. 70).
4 Ter Weel (1999) shows an index of the log hourly wages of employees in the Netherlands and the
difference in log hourly wages between the 90
th and 10
th percentile of the wage distribution. In contrast
with findings for the United Kingdom and the United States, wage dispersion between the highest and
lowest earners fell in the Netherlands in the 1990s and only rose by some four percent in the period 1986-
1998.3
explain why the demand for skills and the college premium increased sharply following
the large increase in the supply of skills, and also why as opposed to the skill-replacing
technical advances of the eighteenth century, today most new technologies appear to be
skill-complementary – as in Griliches (1969).
5 Although there is in general agreement
that demand has shifted towards the skilled due to the fact that new technologies should
be more skill-complementary today than in the past, Acemoglu’s approach is not able to
explain the increase in the supply of skilled workers which goes along with non-rising
wages.
6
Third, it has been argued that although technology can account for a significant part of
the rising unemployment among unskilled workers, other factors play a role too. Allen
(1996), investigating the United States, and Machin and Van Reenen (1998), in an
empirical investigation of seven OECD countries, suggest that technical change alone can
only account for a third or less of the changes in employment shares. Murphy, Riddell,
and Romer (1998) – in a comparative study of the United States and Canada – argue that
differences in the demand for workers do not account for the discrepancies in income.
They note that in Canada the government had adopted a variety of post-secondary
educational policies that boosted the number of workers at that level of education. This
resulted in a lower wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers compared to
the United States. Hence, it is the supply of educated workers that explains the difference.
Finally, Nickell and Bell (1995) investigate whether increased mismatch can explain the
rise in European unemployment levels. However, they argue that there has been relatively
little increase in mismatch and that most of the increase in European unemployment has
other roots.
                                                          
5 See also Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998).
6 Acemoglu (1999) offers a theory in which these labour market developments may be caused by a
qualitative change in the composition of jobs. He argues that an increase in the proportion of high-skilled
workers or skill-biased technical change can create this change in composition by considering a pooling
and segregation equilibrium. In the former both low- and high-skilled workers are employed in the same
jobs and wage differentials are compressed. In the latter, firms separate between jobs for low- and high-
skilled workers and wage inequality is higher than in the pooling equilibrium. Becker and Murphy (1992)
and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) also provide theoretical studies of this process.4
We suggest an alternative explanation to the observation of rising investments in
education and skill levels among workers, while the reward is not rising and
unemployment is not falling. We suggest a framework in which investment decisions do
not only hinge upon the expected future wage. Motivated by this reasoning we build on
and extend the work of Pissarides (1990)
7 on job matching and unemployment by
including two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, thereby creating a dual labour
market and by integrating the supply-side approaches of Schultz (1961) and Becker
(1962) on human capital formation and the demand side frameworks developed by
Spence (1973) and Thurow (1975) on screening and job competition, respectively.
8
In doing so, we start from the premise of a kind of dual labour market consisting of
skilled and unskilled labour – as in Bulow and Summers (1986), Davis and Reeve (1997),
De Groot and Van Schaik (1997) and Davis (1998) – but allow skilled workers to work in
an unskilled job. In our general equilibrium model employers demand skilled and
unskilled labour to produce two types of goods. Since only a limited number of jobs are
available in both sectors, an increased supply of skilled workers leads to full employment
in the skilled sector, while the remaining skilled workers are temporarily hired in
unskilled jobs. Hence, unskilled labour will be crowded out of the labour market into
unemployment, explaining the dramatic rise in unemployment among unskilled workers
in most European countries. This phenomenon is known in the literature as bumping
down of skilled workers, since these workers wait for an opportunity to find a job in the
skilled sector – cf. Borghans and De Grip (2000) which contains several contributions on
bumping down. As we will show, bumping down of skilled labour into unskilled jobs is
also an explanation of the persistent level of overeducation in many countries.
Job search is a major component of our model. Unlike Pissarides (1990), we combine job
                                                          
7  See also Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (1994).
8 Although Pissarides (1990), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Phelps (1994) build models which
treat both sides of the labour market, the relationship between job competition models, human capital
theory and matching theory is never explicitly stated and or investigated. In Muysken and Ter Weel (2000)
we also develop a framework in which the interaction of schooling decisions, search duration,
unemployment, skill differentials and the level of wages is provided. A drawback of that approach is that
we are not able to explain the perturbing phenomenon of dramatically rising unemployment rates in the5
search with a process of screening and job competition and with human capital
investment. As a result, the impact of human capital investment is not solely aimed at
increasing the expected future wage but also to both give a positive ‘signal’ to the
employer (who is screening the labour market for workers) and to enter the ‘labour
queue’ at the highest possible rank. This behaviour is apparent for instance in the
Netherlands, where many students try to obtain additional knowledge and skills by taking
as many courses as they can besides the ordinary curriculum. The effect of this
overinvestment in skills is that employers, knowing this behaviour, ask for higher skills
than necessary for a particular vacancy. Because of the excess supply of skilled workers
they will always find someone either giving the best signal or on top of the queue. This in
turn induces workers to even more invest in human capital to give an even better signal
and to enter the queue even higher. We show that this mechanism applies with non-rising
wages for skilled workers. This mechanism enables us to explain in the context of a
general equilibrium model a rising supply of skilled workers when wages are not
increasing.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyses the basic features of the model and
contains the background for the rest of the paper. Section 3 deals with unemployment and
wage determination among workers and employers. Section 4 endogenises the supply of
labour and analyses the model when employers screen workers and workers have to
compete for jobs. Section 5 concludes.
                                                                                                                                                                            
1980s. Moreover, there are no links to the goods market, so that we are not able to construct a general
equilibrium model.6
2.  The Basic Model
We first outline the basic part of the model and explain its steady state properties. The
basic properties of the model follow Acemoglu (1998), Davis and Reeve (1997) and
Davis (1998), but do not take into account international trade. In this general equilibrium
model we distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers – indicated ‘skills’ H and
‘labour’ L with wages wH and wL, respectively, and relative wage 7 = wH/wL. These
workers produce the skill-intensive good X and the labour-intensive good Y. Both the
goods markets and the labour markets are characterised by perfect competition.
The novel element that we introduce here in this model is that we assume that for skilled
workers search effort is involved in matching jobs and workers and hiring costs have to
be made. As we will show this will also affect human capital accumulation by skilled
workers. In contrast unskilled workers do not invest in human capital and are matched to
the relevant jobs in the production of both goods without any costs.
In this section we will analyse the matching process and its impact for a given labour
market tightness under perfect competition on the labour market. In the next section we
will show how labour market tightness is determined, by its impact on wage bargaining
on the labour market.
A.  Production
Good X is the skill-intensive good and good Y the labour-intensive one. Both goods
markets are characterised by perfect competition. Consumers value both goods according
to the following utility function:
, ] [
/ 1 r r r Y X + = W ' < 1, (1)7
where the elasticity of substitution between X and Y equals 1/(1- '). The prices of the
goods are PX and PY and the relative price is defined as P = PX /PY. Defining total income




















This result implies that the relative consumption of the skill-intensive good is inversely
related to its relative price.
The production of both goods is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas production
functions:
a a - =
1
X X L H X (3a)
and
,
1 b b - = Y Y L H Y (3b)
with 0 <  <  < 1. The restriction  <   implies that X is the skill-intensive and Y the
labour-intensive good.
B.  Matching Skills to Jobs
In the steady state neither job creation nor job destruction do take place. However,
because of their finite lives, skilled workers quit their jobs at an exogenous rate x. New
skilled workers enter the labour market at the same rate and try to obtain a skilled job,
provided it pays a higher wage, i.e. w > 1. Employers require these new skilled workers
to produce both kinds of goods and hence search for them.8





= , m￿, m￿￿ < 0 (4)
where m/v is the matching rate, m (.) represents the matching function and  = v/uH is
defined as labour-market tightness – m, v and uH are the rate of matches, vacancies and
bumping down of skills into unskilled jobs, respectively.
9 We denote uH as bumping
down of skills, because we assume that during the search process for a skilled job, a
skilled worker occupies an unskilled job. Alternatively, one could argue that skilled
workers remain unemployed when searching for a skilled job. However, recent evidence
brought together by e.g. Gautier (1999) suggests that skilled workers occupy unskilled
jobs when they cannot immediately be assigned to skilled jobs.








d = .d ￿ < 0 (5)
(5) exhibits the result that when the skilled labour market is tighter (i.e.  is high), search
duration for skilled workers will be lower. This is a straightforward result, since a high
number of vacancies relative to the number of searchers makes it easier for skilled
workers to find a job and therefore reduces the period of search.
Finally, in the steady state, underemployment of skilled workers equals:
                                                          
9 We assume the initial matching function M(u, v) to be linear homogenous in unemployment and
vacancies. Pissarides (1979), Blanchard and Diamond (1990), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and
Romer (1996) show that constant returns to scale is a satisfactory approximation to reflect the matching




















C.  Demand for Labour and Supply of Goods
The process of search described above is taken into account when we consider the
demand for skills. However, in this section we assume labour market tightness to be
given. We will endogenise this in the next section, when we analyse the impact of labour
market tightness on wage bargaining.
Essential in our analysis is the notion that an open vacancy represents search and hiring
cost to the firm of on average 0 > 0 per period of time – cf. Pissarides (1990). Hence,
the expected capitalised value of the firm’s hiring cost should be added to the wage costs
in the demand function for skills. To compensate for these hiring costs, the firm will offer
a new worker a lower wage. Assuming perfect competition also on both labour markets,































































In (7a) the last term of the left-hand side is the expected capitalised value of the firm’s
hiring cost. It varies positively with the interest rate r and the quit rate of skills x; it varies
negatively with the matching rate m. Note that if the firm had no hiring costs, 0 would
equal zero and (7a) would reduce to the standard marginal productivity condition for
employment in the steady state. We will consider only situations in which 0 is larger
than zero.10

































1-￿. The intuition behind this relationship is that when
the relative price P increases, firms make higher profits producing good X. Therefore,
skills will be lured away from the production of good Y and will be utilised in the
production of good X. We define this relationship between 7 and P as the price
determined real wage (PRW), which is represented graphically in the second quadrant of
Figure 1. From (8) it also follows that the relative wage is lower, given P, when we
incorporate the costly matching process. Finally, labour market tightness has an impact
on the wages of skills – cf. equation (4).
Following Davis (1998) we can also depict the PRW-curve as a negative relationship





























1-￿. (9) is depicted in the third quadrant of Figure 1.
10
To analyse demand for skills and labour more explicitly, we define total demand as
H = HX + HY (10a)
and
L = LX + LY. (10b)
                                                          
10 In the figure the low-skilled wage is relative to the price PY, whereas the latter is normalised to unity.11
Arbitrage between sectors results in a negative relation between relative wages 7 and
relative demand for labour h  H/L.
11 The demand curve for skills relative to labour will
be downward sloping for two reasons. First a higher 7 implies that skills become more
expensive; hence they will be demanded less in the production of both goods. Second,
apart from this direct effect, there also is an indirect effect. A higher relative wage means
that the skill-intensive good becomes more expensive and therefore consumer demand
will shift towards the skill-extensive good. The resulting downward sloping demand
curve  h
d is presented in the first quadrant of Figure 1.
D.  Investment in Human Capital and Supply of Skills
Supply of skills is determined by considering investment in human capital – cf. Davis and
Reeve (1997). It is assumed that N persons, each with a working life of T years, enter the
population each year, whereas N old persons retire each year. Out of these newcomers, E
(< N) persons will choose education during j years – j is exogenous.
12 These E skilled
persons have an average efficiency q >1 which is also a measure of their skills – the
efficiency of an unskilled person is normalised to unity. Hence, in the steady state we
find in terms of efficiency units by definition:
) ( j T qE H
S - = (11a)
and
T E N L
S ) ( - = (11b)
for the supply of skills and labour, respectively. The wage for labour is wL and employers
pay wH per efficiency unit of skill.
13
                                                          
11 This is elaborated in the Annex to this paper.
12 The exogenous quit rate x of skilled workers therefore is x = 1/(T-j).
13 In the analysis above, we did not distinguish between efficiency units and persons. However, demand for
skills now should be interpreted in terms of efficiency units.12
Actually, the average skill q of skilled persons is determined by the amount of aggregate
new skills in the economy, Q, relative to the number of new skilled workers, E, i.e., q =
Q/E. The generation of Q is assumed to be linear homogenous in K and E, where K
represents an exogenous amount of educational capital. The generation of skills also
increases in the number of years of education j – which is given here. Moreover, the
generation of skills has decreasing returns to skilled persons – i.e. QE > 0, QEE < 0.
Therefore each additional skilled person will lower the marginal productivity of skills QE.
Anticipating our model of job competition below, we assume that persons are ranked
such that they have sequentially access to education. This ranking can be random or
based on reasons exogenous to this analysis. But next to this ranking we assume that each
person that followed education embodies the marginal skills he or she has generated. As a
consequence, following Becker (1962), the supply of skills relative to labour is
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0
. (12)
This equation should be amended, however, since we assume that skilled workers when
searching for a job are temporary working on labour jobs and then earn the unskilled
wage. Therefore we should also take the given search duration d into account.
14 The
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0
. (13)
From this equation it follows that the amount of skills that will be supplied at the relative
wage w is determined by
                                                          





















Since QE is a decreasing function of E, we obtain that E is increasing in 7 too.
15 Hence




in 7. This relationship is presented as the supply curve h
s in the first quadrant of Figure 1.
From this figure we also observe that an increase in d shifts the supply curve to the left
leading to a higher 7.
E.  General Equilibrium
The first quadrant in Figure 1 shows how the equilibrium level of skills relative to labour,
h
F, is determined by equality of relative supply and demand on the labour markets. The
second quadrant shows the simultaneous existence of equilibrium on both goods markets,
determined by the equilibrium level of relative wages and prices 7
F and P
F, respectively.
Finally, the equilibrium wage for labour is wL
F as is shown in the third quadrant of the
figure.
One should realise that in this situation underemployment of skilled workers occurs at the
rate uH
* - cf. (6). However, since we assume that skilled workers can always occupy an
unskilled job, skills will always be employed. As a consequence unemployment will
occur among labour at a rate uH
*h
F – this can be considered as natural unemployment.
[insert Figure 1 over here]
                                                          
15  We assume that the amount of educational capital K is such that w > 1 holds for all relevant values of E.14
3.  Unemployment and Wage Bargaining
The basic framework of the previous section now will be amended to include
unemployment, apart from natural unemployment. For simplicity we assume that the
unskilled wage is fixed by a minimum wage, while the skilled wage is determined by
wage bargaining.
16 Unemployment then is determined by a combination of the minimum
wage and wage bargaining.
A.  The Minimum Wage
Consider some fixed legal minimum wage for labour in real terms – for analytical
convenience we express this relative to the price of the labour intensive good. Moreover,
it seems reasonable also to index the other nominal element in wage costs, i.e  the hiring
costs g0 – they are also defined relative to the price of the labour intensive good.
The fixed real minimum wage wL
* lies above the equilibrium wage for labour, wL
F in
Figure 1. Since the minimum wage wL
* exceeds the market wage for labour wL
F, good Y
will be relatively expensive and the relative price of X will be below its equilibrium price
level P. In terms of Figure 1: P
F > P
*, where P
* is the relative price when the legal
minimum wage is introduced. Moreover, the corresponding relative wage 7* will be
below its equilibrium level, i.e. 7
* < 7
F. It is important to note that by fixing the real
minimum wage for labour, the relative wage is fixed too. This can be seen not only from
Figure 1, but also from equations (8) and (9).
17




F. One also sees from Figure 1 that at the relative wage 7
*, the relative
                                                          
16 Muysken, Sanders and Van Zon (1999) provide a model in which bargaining takes place in both the
skilled and unskilled labour market. The properties of the model are similar to the ones we obtain here.
17 One should realise that by indexing the hiring costs g0, g0/wL is fixed too.15
supply of skills falls to h
F*, which lies even further below relative demand for skills h
*.
Thus unemployment will occur.
B.  Wage Formation and Labour Market Tightness for Skills
Supply of skills will no longer be determined under perfect competition, i.e given the
wage for skills. We now assume that skilled wages are determined by a Nash-bargaining
game, in which the bargaining power, 0 <  < 1, of workers and employers is represented
by  and 1-, respectively.
 The resulting bargained real wage (BRW) is represented by






g + + - = , (15)
where g represents the marginal productivity of skills relative to labour. Since 0 is the
average hiring cost for each additional skilled worker, it is clear that these costs are added
to the marginal product. As a consequence, BRW is increasing linear in labour market
tightness.
18 This relationship is represented in the first quadrant of Figure 2.
In spite of the bargaining process (15), the relative wage 7 is fixed at 7
* by equilibrium
on the goods market (8). This means that the PRW is independent of  and hence can be
represented by a horizontal PRW curve in the first quadrant of Figure 2. However, 7
* is
still, like h
*, conditional on the expected capitalised value of the firm’s hiring cost – cf.
(7). Therefore an increase in the average hiring costs, the interest rate or the quit rate,
results in a lower 7
* and hence shifts the PRW-curve downwards.
From the first quadrant of Figure 2 one sees that labour market tightness will adjust in
such a way that the bargained real wage is consistent with the fixed price-determined real
wage.
19 The resulting value is denoted by 
* in Figure 2.
                                                          
18 We ignore the possible relationship between productivity g and labour market tightness q.
19 See for a model with similar assumptions and properties Carlin and Soskice (1990).16
From equation (5) we know that the mean search duration now is determined by d(
*).
Since the relative supply of skills is conditional on search duration, the h
s-curve in the
second quadrant of Figure 2 is derived by substituting d(
*) in equation (14). Relative
labour supply at 7
* then is given by h
F*.
Finally, equation (6) is presented in the fourth quadrant of Figure 2. We know from this
equation that in the steady state underemployment equals uH
*.
C.  Unemployment
From Figure 1 we know that relative demand for labour is fixed at h* by the legal
minimum wage – it is conditional on the expected capitalised value of the firm’s hiring
costs. In the second quadrant of Figure 2 demand for labour is represented by the vertical
curve labelled h
*. For each amount of skills supplied H
s, potential employment of labour
is now only H
s/h
*. However, skilled workers, when searching for a skilled job, occupy
temporarily labour jobs. As a consequence, uH
*H
s skilled workers are employed in a




Unemployment of labour, u = U/L









u - - = . (16)
Unemployment u is typically increasing in h > h
F* and equals u
* at h = h
* as can be
observed from the third quadrant of Figure 2. It is obvious from the above that
unemployment  u
* is higher, the higher the legal minimum wage is. This can be easily




F* will increase for two reasons. First, a lower 7 shifts h
F* to the right in
the second quadrant. Second, a lower 7 shifts the (conditional) h
* curve to the left, as can
be observed from the analysis concerning Figure 1. The resulting unemployment curve is
depicted in the third quadrant of Figure 2.17
The analysis underlying Figure 2 can now be summarised as follows. Given the real
minimum wage for labour wL
*, through arbitrage on the goods markets the relative wage
is fixed at 7
*. This implies that labour market tightness will become 
* to set the
bargained real wage also at  7
* - underemployment of skills then equals uH
*. In addition,
the mean duration consistent with 
* determines the supply of skills, represented by h
s.
The relative wage 7
* then establishes relative demand and supply at h
* and h
F*,
respectively. Finally, the information on h
*, h
s and uH
* determines the unemployment rate
of labour at u
*.
Given the impact of duration on labour supply, one sees that unemployment of labour
above its natural level is not only determined by the minimum wage, but also by the wage
bargaining process. An increase in bargaining power of the workers will increase the
bargained real wage and hence underemployment uH
*. Moreover, because of the
increased mean duration of underemployment, supply of skills relative to labour at 7
*
will decrease such that h
F* will be lower too. It is obvious that both factors contribute to a
higher unemployment of labour at the same minimum wage. A similar observation holds
for an increase in real hiring costs. However, this will also decrease the relative wage 7
*
in relation to the fixed real minimum wage wL
* - cf. (8) – which even leads to a further
deterioration of unemployment. Finally one sees that the impact of a decrease in the
minimum wage on unemployment of labour is clearly mitigated, through it adverse effect
on the bargained real wage.
[insert Figure 2 over here]18
4.  Job Competition and Endogenous Skill Upgrading
As we stated in the introduction, the supply of skills during the past decades is not likely
to be the result of increasing returns to education. This is inconsistent with traditional
human capital theory. Nonetheless, educational decisions are to some extent forward
looking and not independent of returns. To explain this observation, but also to maintain
the notion of forward looking behaviour, we introduced the impact of search duration in
the investment decision on human capital. In the previous section we emphasised the
impact of returns on this decision. Now we will add to that the insight that education can
also be used directly to shorten search duration.
In general workers perceive that more job opportunities arrive when their level of
education is higher. As Thurow (1975) states in his theory of the labour queue, one of the
most important characteristics to increase employment opportunities is the level of
education. This might be plausible for several reasons. For instance, Weiss (1995) points
out that higher educated workers probably also have better unobservable characteristics
like  a better work attitude, a lower propensity to turnover and better health. Workers
might use this correlation as a means to signal their abilities. Employers might also use
this as additional information since education is an important characteristic in their hiring
decision, i.e in screening the applicants. Both the signalling approach and the screening
approach can be seen as important extensions to human capital theory with similar
implications. Together they are dubbed by Weiss as the ‘sorting’ approach.
20 Other
approaches by e.g. Phelps (1998) argue that higher skilled workers are reducing training
cost; Brunello and Medio (1996) regard education as an entry ticket because it reduces
training costs and it signals unobserved ability; and finally Ter Weel (1999) argues that
higher skills are more likely to be applicable in several different types of jobs and hence
                                                          
20 Weiss (1995) discusses several empirical findings with respect to the relationship between wages and
education which can be explained better by sorting than by the learning explanation which is usually
associated with human capital theory. A recent approach by Swinkels (1999) analyses the seminal work of
Spence in a game-theoretic environment. His version of Spence’s model analyses a model in which firms
can make job offers before workers have completed their formal education. The outcomes of the model19
can be allocated to a wider spectrum of jobs than lower skills. This evidence indicates
that education has a positive impact on the matching process described above.
For that reason we  add to the matching function the notion that the probability of finding
a match is increasing in q. However, these skills q should be seen relative to the level of
skills q required by the employers.







q = , mq > 0, mq, mqq < 0, q > q (17)
The implications of the introduction of extended matching function in the above
framework are twofold. First, individuals want to invest more in human capital to
improve their labour market position. However, this is only possible when the years of
education j will increase – this will increase the marginal product in the generation of
skills and hence the actual skills of each educated person. We assume that sufficient
pressure will be built up to increase j indeed, for the years of education were given until
now. So everybody will invest more in skills, which is plausible since all skilled workers
want to obtain a skilled job. It seems plausible, however, to assume that given the general
increase in the level of skills, employers will also increase the level of skilled required, q.
For simplicity we assume that on average the ratio between the supplied quality q and the
demanded quality q remains unchanged.
22 Hence, increased educational levels will not
affect relative wages. This van be seen by introducing the new matching function (17) in


























                                                                                                                                                                            
predict that due to such offers workers become overeducated in order to separate themselves from less able
workers.
21 This could be interpreted as Spence’s (1973) inference rule, which reveals that employers infer that they
want to employ workers with skills of at least q. As a result, the rate at which a vacant job, requiring the
perceived level of demanded skills q
 becomes filled by a person with skill level q can be described by (16).
22 An alternative mechanism with the same outcome is suggested by Acemoglu (1999). He obtains in a
segregation model that firms, when facing increased supply of skills, become more selective and screen
more intensively. Hence q increases to q.20
which shows that w will not change when q/q does not change. Hence the right part of
Figure 2, i.e. the first and the fourth quadrant, is not affected by the analysis.
The second effect is that the increased years of education and therefore increased levels
of skills have effects on the supply of skills relative to labour, which is presented as the
supply curve h
s in the second quadrant of Figure 2. It follows from the analysis in Section
2.D that when individuals invest more in education the h
s curve shifts outward, simply
because of increased skill supply at the same relative wage. This outward shift is
presented in the first quadrant of Figure 3, together with the vertical relatiive demand
curve at h
*.
Combining the effects of a non-changing 7 according to (18) and the shift in the h
s curve
we observe the following. Since wages are at 7
*, as a result of the legal minimum wage,




This affects the rate of unemployment (16) in the following manner
* *
*














u - - = < - - = . (19)
This is shown in the lower quadrant of Figure 3.
As (19) shows, the increase in unemployment from u
* to u
** is the result of an increase in
the equilibrium level of the relative supply of skills from h
F* to h
FF*. This implies an
increased bumping down of labour by underemployed skilled workers. increases because
relative supply of skilled workers increases at the same rate of underemployment.
Referring to the observation at the beginning of this section, we have shown how job
competition among skilled workers leads to u
** > u
* with unchanging relative wages 7
*.
The equilibrium supply of skills has increased, without an increase in skilled wage but
with increasing levels of bumping down of skills into labour jobs and  as a result
increasing unemployment levels of labour. This increased number of skilled workers
employed in unskilled jobs points towards a general level of overeducation, which is one21
of the contemporary peculiarities of many European labour markets, particularly the
Dutch.
[insert Figure 3 over here]22
5.  Concluding Remarks
The wages of the 90
th percentile of the wage distribution relative to the 10
th percentile of
the wage distribution have not increased dramatically in for instance the Netherlands over
the past fifteen years. In the 1990s the difference even fell, indicating decreasing
polarisation in the wage distribution. Although this observation might exhibit the effects
of the consensus policies among labour unions and employer’s organisations, which
resulted in wage moderation and better conditions for the unskilled and hence in a
narrowing wage distribution since the late 1980s, the dramatic increase in educational
attainment and the subsequent rising skill levels potentially suggest increasing wage
dispersion.
In this paper we have formalised the observation of increasing supply of skills without
rising wages. As a result of job competition among skilled workers, for a fixed number of
skilled jobs, we have shown that an increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers
did not increase relative wages. These results fit the facts for the Netherlands and other
European countries quite well, since educational attainment increased over the past
decades whereas wages did not rise dramatically. The adjustment process went through
on the one hand bumping down of skilled workers into unskilled jobs and on the other
hand crowding out of unskilled workers into unemployment.
The observation on this adjustment process enables us to explain the persistent and high
levels of overeducation in European countries, e.g. the Netherlands and Sweden. When
education is used as a signalling device and is applied as an effective ‘tool’ to compete in
the labour market, a higher level of education has a wage effect in that a higher level of
education increases the opportunity to obtain a skilled job. However, the returns to
marginal education are zero once a skilled job is acquired. In addition, bumping down
will occur, such that skilled workers occupy unskilled jobs. Hence, overeducation is both
present in skilled and unskilled jobs.23
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Annex
To analyse demand for skills and labour more explicitly, we define total demand for both
skills and labour according to (9a) and (9b). Now if we define h = H/L, hX = HX/LX and hY























































































Substituting equation (A.2), (A.3), (9a) and (b) into (A.4) results in a relationship
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This demand for skills relative to labour is negatively related to P and hence 7. The
explanation is that when skills are more abundant, i.e. h is higher, there will be a
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